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Abstract 
Research in information systems includes a wide range of approaches that make a 
contribution in terms of knowledge, understanding, or practical developments. 
However, empirical studies show that discussion of validity in research is often weak. 
In this paper we examine the nature of truth and relatedly correctness in order to 
construct a validation framework that can potentially encompass all the varied forms 
of research. Current debates within philosophy revolve around the idea of a pluralist 
view of truth – that there may be different forms of truth de-pending on context or 
domain. Related to truth is the wider concept of correctness – propositions may be 
true (and therefore correct) but correctness can also be applied to actions, 
performances or behavior. Based on these two concepts, we develop a framework for 
research validity and apply it to a range of research forms including positivist, 
mathematical, interpretive, design science, critical and action-oriented. 
Keywords:   Action Research, Correctness, Critical Research, Design Science, Interpretive 
research, Positivist Research, Simulation, Truth, Validation 
 
Introduction 
Information systems is a wide-ranging discipline involving varied forms of research each with 
different purposes. There is research aimed at producing knowledge, from a variety of perspectives – 
positivist (Dubé and Paré 2003; Straub et al. 2004), interpretive (Klein and Myers 1999; Walsham 
2006b), critical (Klein and Huynh 2004; Mingers 2004) and more; research that aims at producing 
software or IT/IS artifacts – design science (Hevner et al. 2004); and research that hopes to bring about 
improvements to organizational problems – action research (Chiasson et al. 2009). These 
heterogeneous forms of research are carried out in many different ways; based on different and 
sometimes conflicting assumptions; and often use fundamental concepts such as “information”, 
“theory”, “causality” or “knowledge” incompatibly.  
We are not against the idea of pluralism in IS research at all (Mingers 2001a; Mingers 2001c) but we 
do agree with Lee (Lee 1991; Lee and Hubona 2009; Lee et al. 2014; Lee and Hovorka 2015) that 
there needs to be some degree of coherence or rigor underlying these multifarious approaches in order 
to justify and validate the results that end up being published in our journals and used as a basis for 
affecting peoples’ lives.  
In this paper we will investigate one, crucial, element of research – that of truth or correctness which 
in many ways underlies all the others. Scholarly research in any field, not least IS, aims to produce 
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knowledge. This immediately begs the question of what exactly is knowledge, and how does it differ 
from mere belief or opinion? Traditionally, within philosophy, knowledge is said to be “justified true 
belief” (Gettier 1963; Pritchard 2006); that is, it is a kind of belief or opinion about how the world is 
but one for which we have evidence or warrant, and, essentially, that is actually true whether or not we 
can in fact determine its truth. This leads to the further question, what exactly is truth for unless we 
know what truth is, we cannot understand what knowledge is. 
Truth and correctness 
That truth is indeed a goal of IS research has been expressed, for example, by Straub et al (2004) “The 
purpose of validation is to give researchers, their peers, and society as a whole a high degree of 
confidence that positivist methods being selected are useful in the quest for scientific truth” (p. 383). 
However, in most published papers, including that one, the actual nature of truth and how it might be 
discovered is little discussed. This provides the starting point of this paper – what is the nature of 
truth? 
There is a traditional view within philosophy - the correspondence theory of truth (Lynch 2001) - that 
there is a relation of correspondence between beliefs or statements about the world and the way the 
world actually is. But, to clearly articulate a theory of truth we need to specify its elements: what is it 
that can have this truth property (known as the “truth bearer”); what is it that could make the truth 
bearer true (known as the “truth maker”); and what is the nature of the correspondence relation? 
There have, however, been many criticisms of the correspondence view of truth, particularly in terms 
of its realist view of the external world, and this led to a number of alternatives. For example, 
coherence theory which evaluates a belief in terms of it coherence or consistency with other well-
attested beliefs (Walker 1989); pragmatism which focusses on long-term success in practice (James 
1976; Peirce 1878); or consensus theory (Habermas 1978) which sees truth as that which a relevant 
community of enquirers agrees about. A more radical approach, known as deflationism (Quine 1992; 
Strawson 1950), suggests that actually truth has no substantive nature to be explained, and that it is 
really just a linguistic pseudo-problem.  
More recently, in the face of the stand-off between these competing positions, a new approach has 
been developing within philosophy that aims to retain the idea that truth is a substantive concept, and 
some form of realism about the relation to the external world, whilst accepting the criticisms of 
standard correspondence theory. This approach involves a pluralist view of truth: “truth is one and 
truth is many” (Lynch 2009) – there are generic characteristics of truth but these may be realized 
differently in different domains (Lynch 1998; Pedersen and Wright 2013b). For example, in the 
physical domain one might hold a correspondence view while in the mathematical domain one might 
have a coherence view.  
Whilst truth may be a defining characteristic of knowledge, as we saw above not all IS research 
concerns purely knowledge - design science, for example, aims to produce effective software or 
artifacts, and action research aims to solve problems in organizations. In these domains it may not 
actually be appropriate to talk about truth but rather the related term correctness (Engel 2013; 
Thomson 2008). It seems more satisfactory to say that a computer system works “correctly” rather 
than “truly”.  In many areas truth and correctness are equivalent – if a belief is true then it will also be 
correct, while a belief that is incorrect would thereby be false. But correctness is a wider term than 
truth in that it applies to things other than beliefs or propositions, for example actions or procedures.  
The purpose of this paper is to develop a general framework, based on the concepts of pluralistic truth 
and correctness, which can be applied across all areas of research in IS. Essentially, this will specify 
criteria for evaluating the rigor and validity of the research whatever its particular paradigm or 
method. This is akin to the proposal of Lee and Hubona (2009) that the fundamental logical laws of 
modus ponens and modus tollens can be applied across many research methods to produce more 
rigorous research. 
In the first section of the paper we explain the pluralist view of truth and its relation to correctness. In 
the next section we develop a general model of truth and correctness and their links to research 
validity. Then in the third section of the paper we apply the framework to a variety of research 
approaches – positivist statistical analysis, mathematical modelling and simulation, interpretive 
research, critical research and finally action research. In the final section we discuss the benefits of this 
framework. 
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Theories of Truth and Correctness 
Pluralist theories represent a new development in response to the stand-off between the different truth 
theories. Generally, many philosophers do wish to maintain a substantive version of truth and do see 
correspondence theory as the most intuitive approach and so, in response to the criticisms of 
correspondence, they have developed the general idea that there may be different versions of truth 
dependent on the domain of knowledge concerned.  There are three possible approaches (Pedersen and 
Wright 2013a) – strong pluralism which sees only many versions of truth with no overarching unity to 
them, a position not held by many. Weak pluralism, which holds that truth is one and many – there is a 
general conception of truth, often characterized in terms of a number of properties that all forms of 
truth must have (called platitudes or truisms), which is realized differently in different domains. And, 
third, what could be called correspondence pluralism which maintains that there is only 
correspondence theory but this itself can be differentially realized.  
Putnam (1994) was perhaps the first to suggest that there are many ways in which propositions can 
relate to reality and that therefore the word “true” may be realized differently depending on whether 
we are talking about physical reality, mathematics or morality. Lynch (1998) followed up with a 
functionalist approach asking what are the functions of truth – e.g., objective, correct to believe, and 
aimed at facilitating enquiry – suggesting that these functions could be met in different ways. Pedersen 
and Wright (2013b) provides a state-of-the-art view of alethic pluralism (Smith 2015).  
The main point for this paper is the argument that truth is a vital component of knowledge, and thus of 
great importance for IS research, and further that a pluralist view of truth is most compatible with the 
many domains and approaches of IS research. 
Relation between correctness and truth 
While truth may be seen as the constituting feature of valid knowledge, there are domains of IS in 
which it does not seem so appropriate, at least in any but its pragmatist forms. Examples are design 
science, which is concerned with the design of effective and efficient computer systems, or action 
research where the aim is effective problem-solving in organizations. It does not seem appropriate to 
talk of a computer system being “true” but we can say that it is working “correctly”. Correctness is 
clearly related to truth: Horgan (2001) talks of truth as “semantic correctness” and Floridi (2011b) 
discusses a “correctness theory of truth”.  In this section we will explore the notion of correctness with 
a view to seeing if it might be a more appropriate term for, at least some, information systems. From 
its dictionary definition, correctness can mean three things – true or conforming with the facts; in 
accordance with accepted standards; and free from error. The third is essentially the obverse of the 
first two so we are left with two, the first as a synonym for truth, at least as correspondence, and the 
second wider meaning as conforming to some accepted or agreed standards or norms (Finlay 2010).  
Many things may be said to be correct or incorrect: mental states such as believing or knowing; 
actions or performances such as a statistical analysis or a logon procedure; representations such as a 
map or a computer model; information; a move in a game; or an English sentence. What is it these all 
have in common and how does this relate to truth?  
Thomson (2008), in a major work on norms, claims that correctness has two aspects. First, correctness 
is always relative to the kind of thing it is applied to. A map of England may only be correct as a map 
of England, not just correct in general. Correct is an attributive adjective like “good”, it is always 
relative to a particular kind, K. The kind, K, fixes what properties the thing needs to have to be correct, 
essentially an exemplar of what the kind (or set) K would be. Note that some kinds of things do not 
have such exemplars, e.g., pebbles or shades of grey, and so cannot be correct or incorrect.  
Second, with some kinds there are, in fact, two different ways in which something may be said to be 
correct. Consider an action such as asserting a proposition, “the computer system is down this 
morning”. The first form of correctness concerns the manner in which the assertion is made – is it 
correct English such that it makes sense and is comprehensible? This Thompson calls “internal-
correctness” or “i-correctness”. Many other actions can be said to be correct or incorrect in this sense, 
for example performing a symphony or spelling a word.  
But with an assertion there is a second form of correctness, that is, whether the proposition it asserts is 
correct, i.e., is the computer system actually down? Thompson calls the “external-correctness” or e-
correctness. In the case of an assertion, e-correctness is the same as truth – is the proposition true? 
This is also the case for other speech acts such as describing, answering, reporting or explaining.  
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“In short, an instance of one or other of these speech act kinds is internal-correct just in case the 
speaker carries out the speech enterprise correctly, and external-correct just in case the propositional 
content of his act is true” (Thomson 2008, p. 99) 
One further aspect of these forms of correctness is that i-correctness is normative – it is the manner in 
which something ought to be done; but e-correctness is descriptive – that something is true or not, or 
successful or not. Also, the two are independent of each other – we can have an i–correct assertion of 
something false, or an i-incorrect assertion of something true (if we could understand it).  
There are many other kinds of actions that have both forms, especially purposeful actions. Here i-
correctness is the manner in which the action is performed and e-correctness is whether the goal or 
purpose is in fact achieved. However, there are actions that do not have some external relation, such as 
performing a symphony or spelling a word which can only be i-correct. 
We can also consider mental states such as believing, expecting or assuming which can be said to be 
correct. In these instances, Thompson argues that there can only be e-correctness as believing or 
expecting is simply a mental state, it cannot be performed in a more or less correct way. And again, 
with these kinds the e-correctness is essentially simply truth. Engel (2013) considers the case of beliefs 
(which could of course be manifested in terms of propositions or statements) and agrees that the e-
correctness is in fact truth – beliefs aim for truth and are e-correct when they are true. However, he 
argues that they do have i-correctness which is our evidential reasons (warrants) for believing them, 
which becomes normative in the sense that we should believe things for which we have strong 
evidence, whether or not they are in fact true. 
A Model for Correctness and Truth 
This section will construct a model for combining correctness and truth based on the ideas in the 
above discussion. Thomson’s distinction between e- and i-correctness is fundamental and is the same 
as distinctions in other fields. In particular, it is essentially the same as Horgan’s (2001) distinction 
between the semantic standards of a domain (i-correctness), and the correspondence relations between 
assertions and the way the world is (e-correctness). For Horgan, all (discursive) domains have i-
correctness, assuming they are coherent and well-formed domains, while some have direct e-
correctness and some only indirect e-correctness. 
It is also the same as the distinction made within the context of model and research validation 
(Boudreau et al. 2001; Kleijnen 1995; Lee and Baskerville 2003; Lee et al. 2014; Lee and Hovorka 
2015; Lukka and Modell 2010; Sargent 2013; Venkatesh et al. 2013). Although different terms may be 
used, essentially there are two distinct stages to model validation which we will call verification and 
validation. Verification concerns the internal structure of the model, whether it is a statistical model, a 
simulation model, or indeed a piece of interpretive research. Validation concerns the external aspect of 
the model – whether it adequately represents that which it a model is of. Thus, verification is i-
correctness and validation is e-correctness. Within statistics and measurement theory, these are often 
termed precision (the degree of replicability of repeated measurements) and accuracy (the closeness of 
the measurement to the quantity’s true value). 
We will briefly explain the model here and then look at particular parts in more detail in the context of 
information systems. Here, we look at how e- and i-correctness can be applied to different kinds of 
things or actions 
Representation cover a range of things that may have different purposes – a picture or photo may just 
describe something; a theory may explain why something happened; a simulation model may try and 
replicate behavior. Whether they are e-correct depends both on their correspondence but also the 
purpose – a map of the London underground is not correct in terms of walking the streets. 
Procedures are specified steps that need to be undertaken to achieve a result. A mathematical proof 
does not correspond to anything but, starting from axioms and following logical rules it can generate a 
conclusion. It is i-correct in terms of adhering to the rules and potentially other criteria such as 
elegance or simplicity. It is e-correct in demonstrating the result. Logging into an account is e-correct 
if it succeeds. It may not be i-correct if done in the wrong way, for example by hacking. 
Information is a disputed phenomenon with different conceptions (McKinney and Yoos 2010). Some, 
such as Floridi (2011a) and Mingers  and Standing (2014), argue that information is both objective and 
true in which case its i-correctness is its semantic meaningfulness and its e-correctness is its truth in 
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some form. Others (Checkland and Holwell 1998b) argue that it is subjective and not necessarily true 
in which case it is difficult to understand what might be correct information. 
There are many artefacts, especially humanly produced, which may have the property of “being a 
good K” if there are standards or properties which exemplars of such a kind exhibit. A good toaster 
produces evenly browned toast; a good information system produces accurate, timely, relevant 
information in an easy to use way. For these, the e-correctness involves meeting the specified 
goodness criteria, which may often be in terms of functions. The i-correctness concerns the form of the 
artefact – is it aesthetically pleasing? Is it robust and easy to use? Is it efficient? Is it economical? In 
these cases there could be disagreements about which properties were part of the function and which 
the form. 
In summary, correctness has two aspects – internal and external – with internal being normative, some 
example of a K is as it should be; external is descriptive, some example of a K bears an appropriate 
relation to an external state of affairs or a goal. Correctness is an attributive adjective that may be 
applied to a wide range of entities or actions. In some cases, e-correctness is essentially the same as 
truth, although not necessarily the correspondence theory, in other cases it is not. Truth is thus a subset 
of correctness. 
Applying the Framework to Information Systems Research 
There are two distinct questions concerning truth – what is it, i.e., what is its nature? And how do we 
discover it, i.e., how do we tell true theories from false ones? We may call these the definitional and 
the justificational questions. The first part of the paper has been concerned with the first question, but 
we now move to the second, practical question – how do we justify our research conclusions? 
Developing a framework that could potentially apply across all research approaches in IS is clearly a 
tall order, and within this paper we only have space to cover what we consider to be the most 
prominent approaches (Galliers et al. 2006; Galliers and Land 1987; Grover and Lyytinen 2015; 
Hirschheim et al. 1997; Hirschheim and Klein 1989; Hirschheim and Klein 2006; Lee and Hubona 
2009; Nissen et al. 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Venkatesh et al. 2013). In particular, 
positivist, interpretive, critical, action research and design science – but we recognize that there are 
others which we have not been able to address in this paper, for example NeuroIS (Reidl 2018) or 
feminist research (Wilson 2016), and of course new areas may develop. As we have already said, we 
would not wish our framework to be seen as rigid and would welcome contributions from other 
approaches. Even within a particular approach, we have had to be selective in our choice of 
perspectives – a whole paper or book could be devoted to validity within a particular domain. What we 
are concentrating on is trying to show that there are potential underlying commonalities across varied 
research approaches, and that an awareness and consideration of these could potentially contribute to 
higher quality research. 
The framework as a whole is presented in Table 1. The succeeding sections of the paper explain how 
the Table is developed from the various research approaches. Columns 2 and 3 concern i-correctness 
and e-correctness  respectively. We can note from the discussion above that i-correctness is essentially 
the same as verification, precision or formative validity (terms used in various fields) and is 
normative. e-correctness is essentially the same as validation, accuracy or summative validity and is 
descriptive. As we consider each research area, we will look at the practice and terminology of that 
area and then endeavour to show that it can be incorporated within our correctness framework. 
Column four shows particular forms of truth that are relevant to the research approach. For reasons of 
space, some approaches will only be discussed briefly. 
Justifying positivist research 
Within IS, there is a considerable literature devoted to justifying empirical, positivist research. There 
is a strong line of good practice recommendations developing, in the main, from Cook and Campbell’s 
(1979) treatise on quasi-experimentation. This was picked up by Straub (1989) and further developed 
in theoretical (Bagozzi 2011; Im and Straub 2015; MacKenzie et al. 2011b; Shadish et al. 2002; Straub 
et al. 2004; Venkatesh et al. 2013) and empirical studies (Boudreau et al. 2001; King and He 2005). In 
theory, this approach ties in directly with our correctness framework; whether it does in practice is 
more debatable. We critique it for being excessively narrow and technically focused, ignoring the 
more general issues of internal and external validity. We then describe an alternative approach 
developed by Lee and Hubona (2009).  
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The original work (Campbell 1957) distinguished between internal and external validity (cf internal 
and external correctness above) while Cook and Campbell (1979) added construct validity and 
statistical validity. However, these forms of validity take on quite specific meanings. And only refer to 
specific forms of statistical research in which there are some underlying latent, subjective constructs, 
and relationships between them, which are then operationalized in terms of particular quantitative 
measures and an instrument to collect data. The instrument is assumed to be some form of 
questionnaire or perhaps experiment.  The point is that there are other forms of positivist research 
beyond surveys and statistics, popular as they may be. 
Moreover, most of the discussion concerns the fairly technical issues of instrument validity and 
statistical validity rather than the more general ones of internal and external validity. Again, these 
latter concepts are defined quite narrowly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, in this approach – internal 
validity only concerns the possibility of there being other causal relationships, i.e., explanations, that 
are not included in the model. In many ways this seems like an external factor since it makes direct 
reference to the external worlds beyond the model, and cannot really be dealt with from a purely 
internal perspective.  
Equally, the idea that external validity primary concerns the extent to which the results can be 
generalized to other populations and settings (King and He 2005) seems mistaken. As Reichardt 
(2011) argues, the fundamental purpose of validation is to assess the truth of the inferences made in 
the model, it is not particularly concerned with how wide or narrow those inferences are.. Whilst 
generalizability is an important and much debated (Lee and Baskerville 2003; Lee and Baskerville 
2012; Seddon and Scheepers 2015; Tsang and Williams 2012), characteristic of a statistical finding, it 
is a separate issue from the question of validity. 
Finally, this approach makes almost no reference to the fundamental issue of designing the study in 
the first place in such a way that the eventual results will form valid answers to the research questions. 
It takes for granted the development of appropriate constructs, hypotheses of the relationships between 
them, and the initial determination of the appropriate measures and data collection instrument and yet 
arguably these factors are much more important for overall validity or correctness of the research 
findings that is instrument validity (Johnston and Smith 2010). As the empirical research shows 
(Boudreau et al. 2001; Jones 2004; King and He 2005; Straub 1989), in many cases of papers 
published in leading journals even the most basic aspects such as describing and justifying the 
methods of data collection and analysis are absent. 
Lee and Hubona (2009) provide an alternative approach to validation. Their primary aim is to produce 
a framework that can apply to both qualitative and quantitative research based on the logical forms of 
argument – modus ponens (p implies q; p; therefore q) and modus tollens (p implies q; not q; therefore 
not p) which they call the MPMT framework. They distinguish between formative validity and 
summative validity (taking these terms from education research) and suggest that much IS research 
involves formative validity but little summative validity. Formative validity is the process of forming 
or producing the theory or inference and so this type of validity concerns the extent to which the 
research has correctly followed an accepted procedure. Summative validity is a characteristic of the 
sum result or product of the process that has been followed. It involves comparing the consequences or 
predictions of the theory with observed evidence according to the logic of modus tollens. If a 
consequence or prediction of the theory cannot in fact be observed then the theory does not have 
summative validity and could potentially be rejected. Lee and Hubona show that this approach can 
apply to quantitative research, qualitative research, and even systems design – a system may be 
designed according to an accepted systems design methodology and yet still fail to meet its aims. They 
also argue that of the two, summative validity is more important than formative validity even though 
in practice it is seldom demonstrated, particularly in positivist research. 
 
 
Truth and Correctness 
7 
 
Form of research i-correctness  
(formative) 
e-correctness 
 (summative) 
Relevant forms of truth 
Positivist research: 
statistical  
Content 
Construct 
Reliability 
Statistical validity 
Comparison of predictions with actuality, 
e.g., hold-out samples or cross-validation 
Elimination of alternative explanations 
Correspondence between constructs and 
concepts, and between results and 
actuality; 
Coherence of constructs 
Positivist research: 
simulation and 
mathematical modelling 
Model comparison 
Extreme conditions 
Degeneracy tests 
Sensitivity analysis 
Replications 
Predictive validation 
Historical data 
Event validation 
Face validation 
Graphical animation 
Credibility 
Correspondence between results and 
actuality; 
Coherence of model; 
Pragmatism and consensus about 
operational validity 
Interpretive research
  - 
 - emic 
Confirmability 
Dependability 
Consistency 
Reliability 
Transgressive 
Credibility/ authenticity in the eyes of the 
participants/ subjects 
Interpretive coherence 
Pragmatic coherence: consistency between 
talk and action 
Performativity – the stranger test 
Correspondence between description and 
participants’ world; 
Consensus about authenticity of results 
Coherence of interpretations 
  - etic Theoretical validity – comparison of 
results with theory 
Plausibility in the eyes of the research 
community 
Consensus about plausibility of theoretical 
interpretation 
Design research Methodological validity 
Efficiency 
Ethicality 
Elegance 
Efficacy that the system works 
Effectiveness that it does the right thing 
Pragmatism and consensus about 
operational success 
Coherence of design method 
Action research Declaration of theory and methodology 
Active application of theory and 
participation in situation 
Recoverability 
Effectiveness that the problematic issue 
has been alleviated 
Justification of theoretical contribution 
Generalizability to other contexts 
Pragmatism and consensus about 
operational success 
Consensus about plausibility of theoretical 
learning 
Coherence of results with methods used 
Critical research Critical perspective and use of critical 
theories 
Participative research design 
Analysis of underlying, coercive 
mechanisms 
Comparison with other contexts 
Researcher reflexivity 
Enlightenment of individual participant 
Change of social arrangements 
Judged by the participants 
Correspondence of theory to social 
mechanisms 
Pragmatism and consensus about 
enlightenment and change 
Table 1 The correctness framework for selected IS research approaches  
 
 Short Title of up to 8 words 
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In order to generate summative validity in statistical-type research (which is the content of this 
particular section), Lee and Hubona argue that statistical validity in the sense of significance tests or 
confidence intervals for various fitted parameters which constitute the hypothesized relationship is not 
sufficient. This is actually part of formative validity. As well as this it is necessary to test the theory’s 
predictive capabilities on out-of-sample data points using hold-out samples or cross-validation. We 
should note, however, a very common problem pointed out by Lee and Hubona – the fallacy of 
affirming the consequent. If we find that the predictions are in fact correct, does that prove or confirm 
the theory? The answer is unfortunately no, since there could always be some other explanation which 
actually accounts for the results. This can be expressed in logic – p implies q; q; therefore p – which is 
not a valid inference. This point relates to Straub’s issue of internal validity which concerns 
alternative explanations. We would suggest that this is mis-named and is really external or summative 
validity – as well as trying to confirm the predictions one also need to actively try and eliminate 
alternative explanations (cf. the section on critical realism below). 
In comparison with the correctness framework, it seems clear that Lee and Hubona’s approach fits it 
very well. Formative validity is essentially the same as internal correctness, while summative validity 
is the same as external correctness and the two are related but independent. We would hope that 
formative validity (i-correctness) would lead to summative validity (e-correctness) but it is not 
guaranteed; while it would be possible to reach summatively valid conclusions even through research 
that was formatively weak. These conclusions are summarized in Table 1 where formative validity is 
shown in terms of four of Straub’s terms and summative validity is developed from Lee and Hubona. 
In terms of truth, the primary form is correspondence between the model and the actual situation or, 
less strongly, just between the results and the data if the model is primarily predictive rather than 
explanatory. There is also coherence truth between the various constructs. 
There are other forms of positivist research such as simulation or mathematical models (Galliers and 
Land 1987) which are included in Table 1 but we do not have space to discuss. 
Justifying interpretive research 
Qualitative or interpretive research is a much more complex area in terms of validation and truth 
(Cole and Avison 2007; Goldkuhl 2012; Lee 2018; Myers and Avison 2002a; Myers and Avison 
2002b; Walsham 2006a). First, there are a wide variety of methods that differ significantly in their 
ontological and epistemological assumptions from relatively objective post-positivist approaches such 
as grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) or “subtle realism” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) 
through textual analyses such as semiotics (Mingers and Willcocks 2014; Mingers and Willcocks 
2017), hermeneutics (Cole and Avison 2007; Myers 2004; Ricoeur 1981) or discourse analysis 
(Cukier et al. 2009) to highly subjectivist or constructivist ones such as phenomenology (Boland 
1985; Introna and Ilharco 2004; Mingers 2001b; Schutz 1972) or post structuralism (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1982; Foucault 1980). Second, there is debate even within methods as to the possibilities of 
some form of external, or even internal, validation at all.  
We would see our framework as potentially helping with this process by exploring underlying 
commonalities between research genres. Where we would differ, perhaps, is in believing that research 
in each genre can benefit from some guidelines as to what constitutes high quality in that genre.  
Papers in IS that provide guidance on doing interpretive research generally fail to discuss validity. For 
example, Klein and Myers’ (1999) authoritative paper provides seven principles that should be 
applied in interpretive research (primarily limited to hermeneutics) but say little about validation 
principles. Similarly, Sarker et al (2013) review empirical studies and also offer guiding principles but 
do not discuss validation. 
Interpretive research begins from the position that its object of study, whether it is actions, texts, 
beliefs or discourse, is socially constructed by the actors involved. Therefore, its primary task is to 
gain an authentic understanding (verstehen) of that meaning in the terms of the actors who produce it 
rather than in terms of theory, or the interpretations of the researchers. For some researchers, e.g., 
ethnographers, that is sufficient whereas others would want to go on and interpret the results and 
perhaps relate them to theory.  
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Moving to possible validity criteria, Maxwell (1992) suggested three forms of criteria based partly on 
different stages of the project. First is descriptive validity which solely concerns the quality of the data 
production process: that it is comprehensive, accurate and not subject to dispute (although the 
participants may themselves hold different and perhaps contradictory viewpoints, these should be 
faithfully recorded). The second is interpretive validity which goes beyond merely recording events, 
actions and discourse to generating interpretations of it, but still from the participants’ point of view 
not the researchers. This has been described as an “emic” viewpoint rather than an “etic” viewpoint 
(Headland et al. 1990), an insider rather than an outsider one. Interpretive validity involves the 
faithfulness or authenticity of the account to those involved, but even here the boundaries are blurred 
because actors are not always fully transparent to themselves and, as Giddens (1979) emphasizes, 
there are often unknown conditions and motivations for action. The third form of validity is 
theoretical validity which does move away from an emic account to an etic one. The researcher aims 
to develop theories that may explain the particular observed behaviors.  Theory could come in two 
directions, from within as in the case of grounded theory where the theory is developed internally 
from the research material, or from without as theory that already exists is applied to explain the 
situation 
In terms of validity, Sandberg (2005) proposes aspects: communicative validity, pragmatic validity 
and transgressive validity. Communicative validity aims for coherence – coherence of understanding 
between researcher and participants; coherence in a hermeneutic sense within the interpretation of the 
material; and coherence between the researcher and other researchers and participants within the 
practice. Pragmatic validity aims for consistency between what the participants say and what they 
actually do. This is necessary because participants accounts are often not open and honest, being 
mediated by politics, storytelling, social codes or impression management (Alvesson 2003). 
Transgressive validity is orthogonal to the other two in searching for ambiguity, complexity and 
contradiction. 
From our validity and correctness point of view we wish to have a classification which is quite 
general and compatible with many of the particular approaches. We would therefore make one main 
distinction, that between emic and etic research. In emic research (which must necessarily come 
before etic) the primary concern is with reproducing, in as authentic and rich a manner as possible, the 
way of life of the actors within a situation of interest, in their own terms. This includes both 
descriptive and interpretive validity in Maxwell’s model. Some research, for instance descriptive 
ethnography, may choose to stop there but increasingly there is a view that even ethnographic 
research should move towards some form of explanation (Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. 2008; Lukka and 
Modell 2010). This moves towards an etic account, which will either be based on or generate theory; 
will be expressed in the researchers’ language; and must be plausible to the research community. This 
is congruent with Cole and Avison’s (2007) use of the trustworthiness of the research process and the 
truthfulness of the results. Based on our correctness framework, both of these emic and etic research 
will have both i-correctness (formative) and e-correctness (summative) validity criteria as shown in 
Table 1.  
In terms of truth criteria in Table 1, correspondence does play a part in that the research aims to 
authentically mirror the participants’ world even if that is to be judged by the participants. Coherence 
is also relevant in assessing the overall interpretation, and consensus as well in terms of the 
participants judging authenticity and other researchers in judging the plausibility of the results. 
Justifying system design: design science and action research 
We are considering these two somewhat different approaches together for two reasons. First, they 
share purposes that make them different from the research approaches we have so far considered – 
that is, they both aim to bring about beneficial change in organizations, one through the development 
of an IT artifact, the other through problem solving which might include developing artifacts. Second, 
because these similarities have already been noted in the literature (Baskerville et al. 2009; Järvinen 
2007; Lee 2007; Sein et al. 2011; Wieringa and Moralı 2012) although Iivari and Venables (2009) 
suggest the similarities may not be deep. But, from the point of view of validation they do have 
significant commonalities. 
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Design science is concerned with producing new and innovative IT artifacts to solve organizational 
problems (Hevner et al. 2004) although Lee et al (2015) point out that it should be the IS artifact not 
just the IT artifact. As Hevner et al ((2004, p. 78) note, “design is both a process (set of activities) and 
a product (artifact) – a verb and a noun” and this concords with the two aspects of correctness in our 
framework – i-correctness (formative) as conforming to a process or methodology, and e-correctness 
(summative)  as successfully achieving its goal or purpose (in this case in terms of its organizational 
stakeholders). Various proposals have been made for a design science methodology (Gregor and 
Jones 2007; Hart and Gregor 2010; Vaishnavi and Kuechler 2008) that have been integrated by 
Peffers et al (2007) into the following general stages (we have included Hevner et al’s (2004) 
guidelines in parentheses where they fit in): 
• Problem identification and motivation (2. Problem relevance) 
• Define objectives for solution (6. Design as a search process) 
• Design and development (1. Design as an artifact; 5. Research rigour) 
• Demonstration (4. Research contributions; 7. Communication of research) 
• Evaluation (3. Design evaluation) 
•  
Note that here the 5th step is actually evaluation, in particular evaluating whether the artifact does 
indeed meet the objectives that were required of it (summative or e-correctness).  
Venable et al (2012) have developed a detailed and comprehensive framework of different methods 
for assessing both formative and summative validity. It is based initially on the 5E’s approach to 
evaluation (Checkland and Scholes 1990) – Efficacy, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Elegance and 
Ethicality. Of these, Efficacy and Effectiveness primarily concern summative validity and the other 
three concern formative validity. Efficacy is the extent to which the artifact performs as it is designed 
to do whilst effectiveness is the extent to which performing those tasks is actually successful in the 
organizational context - does it do what it is supposed to do, and is that the right thing to do? 
In terms of formative validity, first was the artifact designed according to a rigorous methodology of 
whatever kind? Then there are questions as to whether it was developed with an economical use of 
resources (efficiency), according to ethical principles, and ultimately elegantly and aesthetically (the 
Mac vs the PC?)?  One would like to think that formative validity would lead to summative validity 
but unfortunately the high number of IS failures that still happen (Dwivedi et al. 2014; Georgiadou 
and George 2006) shows that this is not the case. These forms of validity are shown in Table 1. In 
relation to truth, clearly the primary one is pragmatism in terms of evidence that the system works 
effectively, and consensus about that (sometimes there can be disagreement about whether a system is 
successful or not. We can also look for coherence in terms of the design method used and its results. 
Moving to action research, although as we have shown there are many who consider the two can be 
intimately linked, in terms of validation we will deal with them separately although Wieringa and 
Morah (2012) actually define the concept of “technical action research” as a specific method for 
evaluating design science.  Action research (AR) (Checkland and Holwell 1998a; Eden and Huxham 
1996) has a long history dating back to Kurt Lewin (1946) and comes in many varieties including 
action learning (Revons 1993), action science (Argyris et al. 1985) and participatory action research 
(Whyte 1991). It has been recommended for research in information systems (Baskerville and Wood-
Harper 1998; Baskerville 1999; Chiasson et al. 2009; Davison et al. 2004). Given this variety we will 
have to consider a very broad description of AR as being constituted by several elements performed in 
a cyclical manner: 
• Initial recognition of problematic issue and entry of researcher 
• Declaration of theories and methodologies thought to be relevant 
• Undertaking action to improve the situation as both participant and researcher (in participatory AR 
the actors are also seen as participant researchers) 
• Evaluate results in terms of improvement to the particular organizational situation 
• Evaluate results in terms of the theory/methodology used and disseminate the learning 
•  
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Checkland and Holwell (1998a) also emphasize the importance of “recoverability”, that is explicit 
documentation of the process followed and decisions made which will help generate the theoretical 
lessons as well as allowing later critical scrutiny. In terms of the correctness or validation of the 
process (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998; Checkland and Holwell 1998a; Eden and Huxham 
1996), we can consider the i-correctness (in Table 2) in terms of the extent to which the AR process 
was followed – declaration of theory, application of theory and participation, and recoverability; and 
the e-correctness in terms of two distinct criteria – the success in terms of resolving the problem, and 
the learning and development of theory which may be applicable elsewhere. It is the latter which 
mainly distinguishes action research from pure consultancy. Forms of truth are similar to design 
research – pragmatism in terms of whether the action was successful; consensus about that success; 
and coherence between the different parts of the research and the results. 
Justifying a critical approach 
In this section we will cover a range of explicitly critical approaches mainly based on the work of 
theorists such as Bourdieu (Kvasny and Keil 2006), Foucault (Willcocks 2004) and Habermas 
(Brocklesby and Cummings 1996; Howcroft and Trauth 2005; Klein and Huynh 2004; Myers and 
Klein 2011) (Mingers 1980); as well as critical realism (Johnston and Smith 2010; Mingers 2004; 
Mingers et al. 2013), and critical versions of interpretive approaches such as critical ethnography 
(Myers 1997) and critical discourse analysis (Cukier et al. 2009). A critical approach, or the idea of 
critique, has two lineages one traceable to Kant and one to Marx (Cecez-Kecmanovic 2011; Mingers 
2000). Kantian critique concerns the limits of our knowledge and research methods while Marxist 
critique concerns the oppressive nature of society. Generally, both are involved in a critical approach. 
However, a critical approach is not primarily about research methods but about attitude and values 
(Cecez-Kecmanovic 2011; Morrow and Brown 1994). In other words, there are not specific critical 
research methods, rather traditional methods, both quantitative and qualitative, are used but with a 
critical intent. Alvesson and Deetz (2000) provide perhaps the most general framework for doing 
critical research that involves three stages : 
Insight – hermeneutic understanding and the archaeology of knowledge. This stage involves gaining 
knowledge and appreciation of the situation of interest using a range of ordinary research methods, 
both qualitative and quantitative. But it will be guided by explicitly critical attitudes and values and 
will view the subjects as active participants in the research rather than passive objects.  
Critique – deconstruction and the genealogy of knowledge This stage involves using varied critical 
theories and constructs to uncover and reveal the often hidden or suppressed mechanisms that distort 
the participants’ understandings of the situation and act so as to maintain this power differential. 
Transformative redefinition – enlightenment and emancipation. This stage aims at enlightening 
participants to the true nature of the situation and thereby helping them to bring about change. It also 
reflexively develops social theory. Final validity is in the judgement of the participants. 
I-correctness concerns the process of research and analysis itself, and whether it has properly followed 
the research steps, primarily from the Insight and Critique stages. We have selected a subset of these, 
since many overlap, to form i-correctness in Table 1. E-correctness concerns the actual success of the 
critical analysis in terms of the change of consciousness of the participants, and change of oppressive 
social arrangements. This is ultimately to be judged by the participants themselves rather than the 
researchers. These criteria come from the Transformative redefinition and again we have taken a 
subset for inclusion in Table 1. 
Conclusions 
The implications of our analysis of truth and correctness are as follows. Research is often carried out 
and published with little explicit regard for its validation (Boudreau et al. 2001; Gonzalez and Sol 
2012; Jones 2004; King and He 2005; MacKenzie et al. 2011a; Straub 1989; Wieringa and Moralı 
2012). For research to make a genuine contribution, either to knowledge or to practice, and to be 
published in journals or lead to organizational change, every effort must be made to demonstrate that 
the results are valid, that is believed to be true or correct.  
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As we have demonstrated, there are two fundamental and distinct characteristics – internal correctness 
and external correctness, also known as verification and validation or formative and summative. The 
first is normative and concerns the way in which the research should be carried out; the second is 
descriptive and concerns the relationship of the research findings to the external context. We have 
shown within the framework criteria for both of these across a wide range of research approaches. We 
agree with Lee and Hubona (2009) that much less attention is paid to e-correctness than i-correctness 
and yet arguably the latter is more important. 
It is tempting also to align these two with rigor and relevance. Certainly i-correctness concerns the 
rigor of the research, and e-correctness is at least related to its relevance although there may be very 
abstract research which does not, at the time, seem to have much direct relevance but one only needs 
to think of the laser or prime number theory to see how such research may later come to have huge 
relevance. In some ways our work can be seen as similar to that of Rosemann and Vessey (2008) who 
are concerned with improving the relevance of IS research. They have produced applicability 
checklists to assess the practical relevance of research through focus groups and nominal group 
technique. Our framework can be used similarly to improve the rigor of research, but clearly the e-
correctness component does already include relevance in methods like design science or action 
research that specifically aim for change but could also include this as a criteria in other forms of 
research if desired. 
We believe that it is important that we have produced a framework that encompasses a wide range of 
methods. Too often, different research methods are seen to be in competition or even in conflict with 
each other. The framework demonstrates that they can all be seen as sharing some very basic 
characteristics, and are all ultimately part of the same human drive to better understand and improve 
the world. By focusing explicitly on both internal and external correctness we hope that the results of 
research will be more informative and effective. 
The way in which research needs to develop is that it needs to explicitly consider both these aspects of 
correctness at all stages – the design of the research, its operationalization, and its description and 
dissemination. We hope that the framework can provide guidance for researchers to consider in 
designing their research, and for referees and editors to look for when evaluating submissions or grant 
applications. 
In terms of limitations and further research, we note the following. The next stage is to apply the 
framework to a range of published empirical research to test its utility. This has been done but cannot 
be included here for space reasons. It is available in a working paper from the authors. 
The framework could be developed to include further research approaches that we have not 
considered, for example theoretical computer science or neuroIS or feminist research or 
multimethodology.  It could also be developed internally to provide a greater discrimination within 
approaches, especially the interpretive area where it may be found useful to have different criteria for, 
say, hermeneutics, phenomenology, textual analysis or semiotics. The advantage of a framework such 
as this is that it makes everything explicit (Klein and Myers 1999) so that it can act as a trigger for 
debate. It may well be that proponents of particular methods may disagree with our validity criteria 
but at least there is now a target to be aimed at. 
For a major research question it may be that all the validity criteria cannot be answered within a single 
study – there may need to be sequential studies, perhaps some formative, and then later ones 
summative; or different methods may need to be applied to different aspects of the situation, thus 
invoking different validity questions. These considerations clearly lead on to the possibility of mixed 
methods work. They also touch on the question of generalizability. In this paper we have 
distinguished the e-correctness (or validity) of a particular study from the extent to which it can be 
generalized to other contexts, but the two are clearly related, and the generalization question raises its 
own validity issues that we have not here addressed.  
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